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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20010555-CA 
v. : 
ANDREW OWENS MALLERY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction for aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly determined that defendant's stop and detention 
was based on reasonable suspicion and probable cause and whether his consent to search his 
pocket was voluntary? 
A trial court's determination of whether an investigative stop was supported by 
reasonable suspicion, whether a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause, and 
whether a consent to search was voluntarily obtained, is reviewed nondeferentially for 
correctness, affording a measure of discretion to the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
939 (Utah 1994) (reasonable suspicion); State v. Wright, 1999 UTApp 86,^6,977 P.2d 505 
(probable cause); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995) (voluntariness of 
consent). The trial court's findings of fact underlying its denial of a motion to suppress are 
reviewed for clear error. State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 140-41 (Utah App. 1997). 
2. Whether the trial court correctly determined that the eyewitness's identification 
of defendant as the driver of the getaway car was constitutionally reliable? 
The trial court's decision to admit eyewitness identification evidence is a mixed 
question of fact and law. The trial court's factual findings are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the court's decision to admit the evidence and will be reversed "only if they are 
against the clear weight of the evidence." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). 
The Court reviews for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the eyewitness 
identification evidence is reliable. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following determinative constitutional provisions and statutes are determinative 
of this case: 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one.count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony 
(R. 5). Defendant filed pre-trial motions to suppress evidence seized from defendant and to 
suppress a positive identification of defendant by the victim shortly after the robbery (R. 56-
63). After a hearing on the issues, the trial judge denied those motions (Minute Entry ruling, 
R. 159-164, attached at Addendum A). Defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced 
by the court to six years to life in prison, which included a one-year firearm enhancement (R. 
216, 254-5). Defendant timely appealed to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 262). The Utah 
Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court (R. 268). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
The Robbery 
Just before 2:00 a.m., on August 18, 2000, Steve Lund was nearing the end of his 
regular shift as a bellman at the Embassy Suites Hotel (R. 272:65, 68). He had driven the 
hotel shuttle van to the Ute Car Wash at 300 South and 300 East in Salt Lake City to clean 
the van (R. 272:65-66). As he was vacuuming the inside of the van, two men approached 
him from behind (R. 272:66). Lund turned around and saw the men standing side by side 
approximately five feet from him (R. 272:66). One of the men pointed a gun at Lund, and 
the other demanded Lund's money (R. 66-67). The man who pointed the gun wore a red 
baseball cap and a blue sweatshirt, the other had a tan shirt on (R. 272:66). Lund complied 
1
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings from 
the suppression hearing. State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994). 
3 
and gave them his money (R. 272:67). Unsatisfied, one of the men also demanded Lund's 
wallet, which Lund handed over (R. 272:67). The men departed north on foot leaving Lund 
standing empty-handed by his van (R. 272:68). The entire encounter lasted from ten to 
fifteen seconds (R. 272:67). 
The robbery occurred directly underneath an overhead light illuminating the 
vacuuming station, and Lund described the lighting as "pretty good" (R. 272:67). Lund had 
a clear view of both robbers, and he focused on their faces, neither of which was masked (R. 
272:67-68). His senses were unimpaired by alcohol or drugs (R. 272:67-68). Lund reported 
that since his regular shift at the Embassy Suites was from 5:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m., and he 
had, as usual, only been awake since noon the previous day, he was not at all drowsy or 
unperceptive (R. 272:68-69). 
Within a moment after the robbers departed, Lund used the van's two-way radio to 
contact the hotel personnel and inform them that he had been mugged (R. 272:69). The hotel 
immediately contacted the police, and when Lund arrived at the hotel five minutes later, he 
spoke to the police dispatcher (R. 272:69). He described the robbers as two Hispanic males, 
eighteen and twenty years of age, one with a gun and a baseball cap, and the other in a dark 
sweatshirt (R. 272:9-10, 77-79). 
The Dispatch 
Police dispatcher Angie Renteria was on duty at 2:00 a.m. on August 18,2000, in the 
Public Safety Building on 315 East and 200 South (R. 272:5). She overheard the call from 
4 
the Embassy Suites regarding the robbery. The call recited a limited description of the 
robbers, that the robber who handled the gun wore a baseball cap and dark clothing and the 
other robber wore a blue shirt, and that the robbers were last seen walking northward from 
the crime scene (R. 272:6-7,9-10). The car wash where the robbery occurred was only one 
block south of the Public Safety Building, so Renteria looked out the window of the 
dispatcher's office to see if the robbers were in view. She saw two men, who appeared to 
be Hispanic, leave an apartment complex on 300 East "just down a bit" from the Public 
Safety Building and get into a Ute cab (R. 272:6-7). Another dispatcher contacted the Ute 
Cab Company and obtained the cab number and destination of the cab that stopped at the 300 
East apartment complex (R. 272:7). The cab company also stated that the cab had picked up 
two Hispanic males (R. 272:14). 
Officer Mike Hamideh was in his patrol car in the Public Safety Building parking lot 
at 2:00 a.m. doing paperwork before going off-duty (R. 272:41-2). He heard the dispatch 
about the armed robbery and the description of the robbers, and he responded to the call, 
driving to the scene to look for suspects (R. 272:43). At the same time, Officer Jeffrey Carter 
heard the same dispatch that two male Hispanics, both eighteen to twenty years old and about 
5*10", one with a gun and wearing a baseball cap and the other wearing a blue sweatshirt, 
were walking north from the car wash (R. 272:17-18, 29, 31). Together, the two officers 
briefly stopped two male pedestrians in the area of the robbery, but quickly released them 
upon determining "they weren't much of a match" (R. 272:18, 49). The officers then 
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received a call that two Hispanic males had been picked up by Ute cab number forty-two at 
an apartment located at 228 South 300 East, near the scene of the robbery (R. 272:7-8, 14, 
18,27-28,43). The officers also heard that the cab was going to 700 North Redwood Road, 
and they intercepted the cab at State Street, traveling west on North Temple (R. 272:18-19, 
42-43). After confirming the cab number with the dispatcher, Officers Hamideh and Carter 
activated the overhead lights on their marked patrol cars and stopped cab number forty -two 
(R. 272:19, 42-43). 
The Stop 
The cab complied with the signal to stop, and the officers exited their vehicles and 
approached the cab from the rear (R. 272:20, 44). Although Officer Carter did not employ 
as intense security measures as in a normal felony stop, he did draw his sidearm, but Officer 
Hamideh did not. Officer Hamideh called out to the two passengers in the cab that the 
officers considered them armed and dangerous and directed them to place their hands in view 
(R. 272:20, 34,44, 51). Officer Hamideh opened the left rear passenger door of the cab and 
instructed defendant to exit the vehicle with his fingers laced behind his head (R. 272:44). 
Officer Carter removed the other suspect, Jesus Israel Rosillo, frisked him, but found no 
weapon, and then handcuffed him (R. 272:21, 34-35). At the evidentiary hearing Officer 
Hamideh identified defendant as the person he removed from the cab (R. 272:44). He also 
testified that although defendant appeared Caucasian, defendant otherwise matched the 
dispatched description of one of the suspects (R. 272:44, 49-50, 52). 
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Officer Hamideh performed a protective frisk for weapons on defendant (R. 272:44-
45). He did not find any weapons; however, he felt a rectangular object "like a wallet or 
something like an ID card" in defendant's right rear pocket, but did not remove it (R. 
272:45). Officer Hamideh advised defendant that he matched the description of an armed 
robbery suspect and handcuffed defendant for officer safety (R. 272:45). Officer Hamideh 
walked defendant toward the rear of his patrol car and asked defendant his name (R. 272:45). 
Defendant replied that his name was Andrew Mallery (R. 272:45). Officer Hamideh then 
asked defendant if he had any photo identification, and defendant replied that he did not (R. 
272:45-46). Recalling the rectangular object he earlier felt in defendant's rear pocket, 
Officer Hamideh asked defendant what was in his right rear pocket (R. 272:46). Defendant 
replied that it was his wallet (R. 272:46). Officer Hamideh said, "Mind if I take that out?" 
(R. 272:46). Defendant replied, "No" (R. 272:46). Officer Hamideh then asked a clarifying 
question, "No, I can't take it out?" to which defendant replied, "Oh, okay, take it out" (R. 
272:46). Officer Hamideh then removed the wallet from defendant's pocket and found that 
it contained a stack of closely packed cards, cash, and a Utah driver's license bearing the 
name Steven Lund (R. 272:46). Officer Hamideh confirmed with the dispatcher that the 
name of the victim was Steven Lund (R. 272: 47). Defendant then spontaneously declared, 
"I found the wallet" (R. 272:47). 
The Show Up 
At the time of the stop, Lund was still at the hotel with an Officer Hawk, who told 
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Lund that two suspects had been detained and that the police wanted Lund to look at them 
(R. 272:71). Officer Drake transported Lund from the Embassy Suites to State Street and 
North Temple, where the cab had been stopped, a trip of less than five minutes (R. 272:69-
70). During the drive from the hotel to scene of the detention, Lund heard over Officer 
Hawk's police radio that the police had found Lund's driver's license on one of the suspects 
(R. 272:80). When he arrived at the scene of the detention, Ljund saw the two suspects in 
handcuffs on the sidewalk flanked by four or five police officers and about as many patrol 
cars (R. 272:38-39, 70). One of the suspects wore a red baseball cap (R. 272:79). Officer 
Hawk parked his patrol car approximately 30 to 40 feet away from the suspects and shined 
his spotlight on them (R. 272:71-72). Without exiting the vehicle or waiting for any 
instructions from Officer Hawk, Lund immediately stated, "That's them" (R. 272:71). Lund 
then told Officer Hawk that defendant had held the gun and that Rosillo had demanded his 
money and wallet (R. 272: 72-73). Lund acknowledged that at the preliminary hearing that 
defendant was a Caucasian (R. 272:81). Nevertheless, Lund was certain of this identification 
and identified defendant again in a line-up at the county jail and a third time at the 
evidentiary hearing (R. 272:73-74). 
Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence found on defendant's 
person during the detention on North Temple (R. 59-64). He argued that the police had 
neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to stop and frisk him and that his consent to 
search his pocket was involuntary (R. 61-62). Defendant also filed a pre-trial motion to 
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suppress Lund's identification of Mallery on the ground that the "initial identification 
procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" and that the 
initial identification tainted subsequent identifications (R. 56). After a hearing on the issues, 
the trial court denied these motions finding that (1) the officers had an articulable suspicion 
to stop the cab and probable cause to believe defendant was involved in the robbery, (2) 
defendant was reasonably detained for the few minutes required to transport the victim to 
identify the suspects, (3) defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his pocket, and (4) 
the victim's eyewitness identification was proper and that there was no inappropriate 
suggestion by police officers (R. 159-164). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's stop and subsequent detention was justified by reasonable suspicion that 
he was involved in the armed robbery, based on reliable reports from police dispatchers who 
collectively received information directly from the victim and who actually witnessed 
defendant and his accomplice leaving an apartment close to and very shortly after the crime. 
The investigative detention, during which the officer frisked and then handcuffed defendant, 
was justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant had participated in an armed robbery 
only moments before, and therefore might be armed and dangerous. Also, the officers 
diligently pursued their investigation by detaining defendant only a few minutes so that the 
victim could be transported for a possible identification. When the victim positively 
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identified defendant as one of the robbers, the officer had independent probable cause to 
arrest him and then search him incident to that arrest. 
Even if the officers' conduct in detaining defendant and his companion expanded the 
scope of the detention to the point of arrest, the arrest was supported by probable cause when 
the officers discovered that defendant and his companion substantially matched the 
description of the robbers. Consequently, both the victim's identification of defendant at the 
site of his apprehension and independent probable cause to arrest justified the officer's 
searching defendant's person i. Moreover, defendant voluntarily consented to the officer's 
removing his wallet, at which point the officer discovered that defendant possessed the 
victim's driver's license. 
POINT II 
The victim's identification of defendant as the armed robber was constitutionally 
reliable. The only compromising factor was the victim's discovery prior to the identification 
that defendant had been found with his driver's license. Although suggestive, this factor 
does not outweigh the patent reliability of the identification. The victim was not impaired 
and plainly attentive to the event, and the identification was made in favorable viewing 
circumstances, was made spontaneously, and remained consistent throughout the 
proceedings. The circumstances of the identification were, in short, altogether more 
favorable than in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY A VALID 
SEARCH OF DEFENDANT INCIDENT TO ARREST AND 
DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
Defendant contends that the investigating officers detained and frisked him without 
either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that he was involved in the armed 
robbery or was armed and dangerous, thereby coercing his consent to search his pocket by 
exploiting the alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Aplt. Br. at 17-25. 
Contrary to his claim, defendant's stop and subsequent detention was justified by 
reasonable suspicion that he was involved in the robbery. Further, the investigative 
detention did not become an arrest merely because the officers approached defendant with 
guns drawn and then frisked and handcuffed him. Given the circumstances of the offense, 
the officers had ample reason to take reasonable measures to protect themselves. Also, they 
diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions by 
detaining defendant only a few minutes so that the victim could be transported for a possible 
identification. Even if the detention amounted to an arrest, the arrest was justified by 
probable cause, which in turn justified a search incident to the arrest. In any event, 
defendant's consent to the search was voluntary. 
11 
A. The officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
occupants of the cab had committed an armed robbery. 
"A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. This court has defined reasonable suspicion as 
requiring that there exist "specific, articulable facts which together with rational inferences 
drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude [that the suspect] had 
committed or was about to commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 
1987). 
When an officer does not observe firsthand the facts and events creating reasonable 
suspicion, he may rely on information relayed from another officer or a dispatcher. State 
v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 1989) (finding that an officer was justified in stopping 
vehicle thought to contain armed robbery suspects based on information from dispatch). 
Under such conditions, the reasonable suspicion analysis is shifted from the officer making 
the stop to the dispatcher or officer issuing the bulletin. Kaysville v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 
234 (Utah App. 1997); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985). This court 
has determined that the three-factor Mulcahy analysis is appropriate for assessing whether 
a dispatcher's report is sufficiently reliable to support "reasonable articulable suspicion." 
State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 ^ 14, 37 P.3d 260. In Valenzuela, this Court 
succinctly set out the Mulcahy analysis for assessing whether a dispatcher's report is 
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sufficiently reliable to support "reasonable articulable suspicion": 
Our first focus is upon 'the type of tip or informant involved,'granting 
identified informants substantially more credibility than anonymous 
informants. Next we examine 'whether the informant gave enough detail 
about the observed criminal activity to support a [seizure],' and concluded 
that '[a] tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant observed the 
details personally, instead of relaying information from a third party.' Finally 
we examine 'whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the 
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip.' 
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, ^ 15 (quoting Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36) (citations 
omitted). These three factors are considered together to determine if, under the totality of 
the circumstances, there exist specific and articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234. 
In this case, the information broadcast to Officers Hamideh and Carter, that in the 
very early morning, only moments after an armed robbery, two partially described suspects 
were traveling in a specifically identified taxi cab from a location proximate to the scene of 
the crime, provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to stop the cab. 
L The source of the information 
The first Mulcahy factor is the credibility of the source of the information. 
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, |^ 15. Courts should grant "identified informants 
substantially more credibility than anonymous informants." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36. 
Where the informant is a victim, veracity may be assumed. Id. at 235; State v. Treadway, 
499 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1972) (finding that a citizen who viewed drugs in defendant's 
motel room is presumed reliable). See also, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 46-47 
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(1970) (holding that speaking with victim and observers provided police ample cause to stop 
defendant's vehicle). 
All of the informants who supplied the information that was ultimately broadcast in 
the bulletin were citizen informants. The victim described the armed robbery and his 
assailants, a dispatcher personally witnessed two males get into a cab near the crime scene, 
and the cab company confirmed that cab number forty-two had picked up two Hispanics at 
228 South 300 East in Salt Lake (R. 272:5-14, 65-67). The victim is presumed reliable 
under Treadway and the police dispatcher and Ute dispatcher are disinterested witnesses 
who are presumed reliable under Maroney. 
2. The amount of detail 
The second Mulcahy factor is '^ whether the informant gave enough detail about the 
observed criminal activity to support a [seizure]." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. The level of 
detail provided by Lund in the present case is similar to that provided by the victim of an 
armed robbery in State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989). The Utah Supreme Court in 
Bruce upheld the stop of the defendant's vehicle based on reasonable suspicion. In Bruce, 
a convenience store clerk received a phone call from a man claiming to have a gun trained 
on her. Id. at 647. The unidentified caller instructed the clerk to place all the money in her 
register into a bag and to give it to a man who would soon be entering the store. Id. Within 
a few minutes a young man did enter the store and told the clerk to comply with the man on 
the phone. Id. The clerk gave the young man the money from her register, and the young 
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man fled the store. Id. The clerk's sister, also in the store, followed the robber at a safe 
distance and observed him entering a walkway between two apartments. Id. at 648. 
Minutes later, the sister saw an orange Datsun station wagon leave the apartment building 
parking lot. Id. The sister did not see the occupants of the station wagon. Id. The clerk 
contacted the police and gave an account of the robbery and a description of the robber as 
a black male approximately five feet seven inches in height, wearing dark corduroy pants, 
a dark sweat jacket with white lines, and a ski cap. Id. The clerk's sister described the 
apartments and the car and also stated that she lived at the apartment complex where the 
orange station wagon was sighted and that she did not recognize the car as belonging to any 
resident of the complex. Id. 
The police dispatcher notified local police units of the robbery and erroneously 
broadcast that the station wagon contained two black males suspected of the robbery. Id. 
An orange station wagon was sighted and stopped, and the defendants, two black males, 
were discovered therein. Id. Police detained the defendants until the victims arrived and 
identified them, at which point the defendants were arrested and charged with armed 
robbery. Id. 
The defendants moved to suppress the victims' identification claiming that the 
victims' information was insufficient to place the robber of the store in the orange car, and, 
therefore, the subsequent stop of the defendant's car was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. Id. at 649. The trial court denied the motion. Id. In upholding the trial court's 
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decision, the Utah Supreme court declared that "[wjhile the police officer who issued the 
broadcast may have improperly placed two black males in the front seat of the orange car, 
other sufficient information was provided and 'articulable facts' existed to support at least 
a 'reasonable suspicion' that the robber of the store was in the orange car." Id. at 650-651. 
As the dispatcher did not have a description of the driver of the orange station wagon, the 
"other sufficient information" cited by the court could only include that the robber fled in 
the direction of the apartments, that the apartments were near the crime scene, that orange 
car left a place near the crime scene soon after the robbery, and that the orange car was out 
of place in the apartment parking lot. 
In this case, the description given to dispatch by Lund was at least as detailed as that 
provided by the victim in Bruce. The description Lund provided contained the same 
elements as the victim in Bruce, that is, defendant's gender, race, height, and clothing (R. 
272:9-10). Lund also estimated the approximate ages of the robbers (R. 272:9-10). The 
court in Bruce relied on mere proximity to the crime scene and to the culprit's direction of 
flight to link defendant's car to the robbery and establish reasonable suspicion to stop 
defendant's car. Ms. Renteria, the dispatcher in this case, confirmed with the cab company 
that the cab had picked up two Hispanics shortly after and near the robbery, and she 
obtained the number and destination of the cab from the cab company, thus ensuring that 
officers located and stopped the correct cab (R. 272:7-14). 
Defendant argues that the description "two male Hispanics" coupled with proximity 
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to the crime scene does not create reasonable suspicion, especially where one of the cab 
passengers is Caucasian. Aplt. Br. at 21. In support, defendant cites several cases. 
However, as a fuller description of each case than provided by defendant makes evident, 
reasonable suspicion was found lacking because either the officers had no evidence that a 
crime had been or was about to be committed or the officers had no evidence linking the 
suspect to the crime.2 
In contradistinction to cases cited by defendant, Officers Hamideh and Carter 
received the following specific information linking defendant with the robbery: (1) an armed 
robbery had been committed at 300 South and 300 East at about 2:00 am and that robbers 
had walked northward from the scene of the crime (R. 272:17-18,41-43); (2) the robbers 
were two male Hispanics, both about 5f 10M and eighteen to twenty years old, one with a gun 
2
 Defendant cites the following cases finding no reasonable suspicion: State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah App. 1987) (finding no reasonable suspicion existed to 
justify stop of trio of men at 3:30 a.m. in high crime area, when officer had received no 
reports of crime in the area and trio's activity was consistent with innocent as well as 
criminal behavior); State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985) (finding no 
reasonable suspicion existed to justify stop of two men walking three blocks from 
burglary at 1:40 a.m., when officers had no knowledge whether men had been at scene of 
crime and officers had not observed any unlawful or suspicious behavior); State v. 
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) {per curiam) (holding that slowly moving 
vehicle, with out-of-state plates, in neighborhood in which a number of burglaries had 
occured, without more, is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion to justify detention 
of the occupants thereof); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) ("The fact that 
appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis 
for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct"). Aplt. Br. at 21-
22. 
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wearing a baseball cap and the other wearing a blue sweatshirt (R. 272:17-18,29, 31); and 
(3) less than twenty minutes after the robbery, suspects matching the description of the two 
robbers were picked up from an apartment located at 228 South and 300 East, less than one 
block from the crime scene, by Ute cab, number 42 (R. 272:7-8,14,18,27-28,43). In sum, 
the officers had a reasonably detailed description of two robbers, at least one of whom was 
armed, who had just committed an armed robbery and who, within moments, left a location 
close to the scene of the crime in an identified vehicle, more than ample information to 
support reasonable suspicion to stop Ute cab number 42. See Bruce, 779 P.2d at 650-51 
(finding reasonable suspicion only on proximity to perpetrator's direction of flight and to 
the crime scene, without suspect's physical description). 
3. The police officersy personal observations 
The third Mulcahy factor is "whether the police officer's personal observations 
confirm the dispatcher's report of the informant's tip." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. Officers 
may confirm the report either by observing the illegal activity or by finding the person or 
vehicle substantially as described by the informant. Id. In Mulcahy, this Court found this 
factor satisfied by the officer's discovering a matching vehicle, only moments after the 
informant's report, traveling in the reported direction. Id. at 237-38. 
The officers' personal observations were essentially the same as in Mulcahy. The 
officers learned from dispatch that Ute cab number 42 was reportedly heading to 700 North 
Redwood Road (R. 272:18). The officers found Ute cab number 42 traveling west on North 
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Temple, in the direction of Redwood Road, as indicated by the dispatcher (R. 272:18-19, 
43). As a further precaution, the officers confirmed the cab number with dispatch before 
stopping it (R. 272:19,43). 
In sum, the investigating officers received from reliable sources information which 
they confirmed and established reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in the 
robbery. 
B. Because the officer diligently pursued a means of investigation likely 
to confirm or dispel his suspicion that defendant was involved in the 
robbery, the stop did not become an arrest requiring probable cause. 
Defendant claims that as soon as the officers' drew at least one of their sidearms 
while ordering him and Rosillo from the cab, and then frisked and handcuffed them, the stop 
immediately became an arrest, requiring probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 20. In support, 
defendant argues that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him and that Officer 
Hamideh's "demand" to know what was in his pocket constituted a search requiring proof 
of both probable cause, which was lacking, and exigent circumstances. Aplt. Br. at 20-21, 
23. These claims are meritless. 
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, 
1)11, 17 P.3d 1135 (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)) (quoting 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983)). Both "the length and 
scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which 
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rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)). "[T]his court has 
held there is no 'bright-line rule as to the acceptable length of a detention because common 
sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.'" State v. Grovier, 
808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). The operative rule, therefore, is 
that "officers must '"diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm 
or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the 
defendant."'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah 
App. 1991) (first two alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 
686,105 S.Ct. 1568,1575(1985) (upholding a 20-minute detention during which the police 
proceeded expeditiously in confirming their suspicion that defendant was involved in 
criminal activity)). See also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment § 9.2(f) at 66 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that "the relative seriousness of the 
offense being investigated and whether the police are inching closer to having probable 
cause for arrest" bears on assessment of whether "police are diligently pursuing a means of 
investigation which is likely to resolve the matter one way or another very soon"). "A court 
making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a 
swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic 
second-guessing." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S. Ct. at 1575. 
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1. The circumstances of the offense and the stop justified the officers' 
reasonable force to detain defendant during the investigatory stop 
In the seminal case, Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held that police 
officers, for their protection, were authorized to conduct a limited search of persons 
reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 92 S. Ct. 
1868,1883(1968). See State v. Rochell,S50P2d 4S0,483 (Utah App. 1993)(recognizing 
authority to "pat down," or "frisk" when "specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion") 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880). "The officer need not be absolutely 
certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in 
danger.'" State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27,92 
S. Ct. at 1883). 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that in conducting Terry stops, 
the investigating officers may take steps reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo and 
to protect their safety including the drawing of weapons. See United States v. Hensley, 469 
U.S. 221, 235, 105 S. Ct. 675, 683 (1985) (holding that the officers were justified in 
approaching defendant's vehicle with pistols drawn when suspect was described as "armed 
and dangerous"). Additionally, courts have consistently concluded that handcuffing 
suspects may be within the scope of an investigatory stop and does not necessarily amount 
to an arrest requiring probable cause. See People v. Erazo, 682 N.Y.S.2d 26, 26 (N.Y. 
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App. Div. 1998) (justified in drawing their guns to apprehend both suspiciously acting, gun 
wielding, armed robbery suspects and holding them in handcuffs); People v. Bowen, 240 
Cal.Rptr. 466, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (fact that appellant was properly securely with 
handcuffs while detained awaiting the victim's arrival does not mean that appellant was 
under arrest during this time); White v. United States, 763 A.2d 715, 721 (D.C. 2000) 
(reasonable for police officer, during valid investigatory stop for weapons, to instruct 
occupants of the defendant's car to step out of the vehicle and to handcuff them before 
engaging in additional investigation, where car was located at a remote area of police 
station's impound parking lot, informant feared the car's occupants presented imminent 
threat, the defendant was a large man and it was two o'clock in the morning). The scope of 
the intrusion varies with the facts and circumstances of each case. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
500, 103S.Q. 1319,1325. 
In this case, the officers had reliable information that the occupants of Ute cab 
number 42 were reasonably suspected of having committed an armed robbery less than one-
half hour before the officers intercepted the cab. There were two suspects. It was about 
2:20 in the morning, a time when Salt Lake City streets are almost deserted (R. 272:17-18, 
27-28,41-43). Defendant and Rosillo complied with the officers' requests to display their 
hands and exit the cab (R. 272:34, 51). Officer Carter did not consider Rosillo, who was 
being detained in the same way as defendant, to be under arrest even though he had been 
frisked and was handcuffed (R. 272:34). However, in these circumstances, the officers 
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would still have been reasonably concerned for their safety. Although the victim reported 
that only one of his assailants held a gun, there was no evidence that both suspects had not 
been armed (R. 272:18). Moreover, even after defendant and Rosillo were frisked and no 
weapon was found, there was no assurance that guns were not concealed in the cab. In sum, 
the stop was classically one in which officers would feel concerned for their safety under 
Terry. Consequently, the officers were warranted in taking the protective measures used in 
this case as part of the investigatory stop, without first needing probable cause to believe 
that defendant had been involved in the robbery. 
2. The officer's mere request to see defendant's wallet 
was not a "search " requiring probable cause 
In support of his claim that the officers' conduct immediately elevated a stop into an 
arrest requiring probable cause, defendant further argues that Officer Hamideh's "demand" 
to know what was in his pocket constituted a search requiring proof of both probable cause 
and exigent circumstances. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. The argument mischaracterizes the 
encounter and misconstrues the law. First, as more fully discussed below in the State's 
response to defendant's claim that his consent was involuntary, see Aple. Br. at Point I.D, 
Officer Hamideh did not "demand" that defendant show the contents of his pocket. Rather, 
as the trial court recognized, Officer Hamideh first asked to see defendant's wallet, then 
clarified defendant's ambiguous response, and finally reached into defendant's pocket only 
when defendant unambiguously consented (R. 160; 272:46). Thus, the record does not 
support that the officer used such force that it might arguably be considered a "search." 
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Second, a mere request to see defendant's identification is patently not a "search/' and 
defendant has cited no authority to the contrary. Contrary to defendant's argument, see 
Aplt. Br. at 21, the court in State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), simply found 
that probable cause justified a search of the defendant's pockets, without determining that 
the officer's request, per se, was a search. Id. at 106-07. 
Finally, asking for the identification of a suspect, reasonably detained on suspicion 
of criminal activity, is preeminently a feature of a straightforward criminal investigation 
which has not yet become an arrest requiring probable cause. In Adams v. Williams, a case 
in which the an officer was held to have reasonably reached into the suspect's car to retrieve 
a gun based on an informant's tip in a level two stop, the United States Supreme Court made 
explicit what it had left implicit in Terry: "A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order 
to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 
88 S. Ct. at 1881) (emphasis added). See also Moore v. State, 55 S.W.3d 652, 655 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2001) ("An investigative detention is a temporary and narrowly tailored 
investigation directed at determining a person's identity or maintaining the status quo while 
officers obtain more information.") (citation omitted). 
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3. The officers diligently pursued a means of investigation to confirm 
or dispel their suspicion that defendant was involved in the robbery 
by detaining him only for the brief period to transport the victim to 
the site of apprehension for a possible idendification 
Upon the general principles governing the scope of investigatory stops set out above, 
and in circumstances comparable to this case, courts have uniformly upheld detentions 
extended for a brief time for the transport of witnesses to confirm or dispel suspicions 
concerning a suspect's identity as the perpetrator of an offense. See Erazo, 682 N.Y.S.2d 
at 26 (officers justified in handcuffing armed robbery suspects until the robbery witnesses 
could be brought to the scene of the apprehension, where defendant was independently 
identified by the two victims within 15 minutes of the crime) United States v. Dickson, 58 
F.3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1995) (15-minute detention of defendant pending arrival of 
witnesses was quickest means of investigation reasonably available to confirm the officer's 
suspicions and did not transform investigative stop into arrest), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1064, 
116 S. Ct. 747 (1996); State v. Buti, 964 P.2d 660, 664 (Id. 1998) (prompt summoning of 
victim to "showup" to identify burglary suspects was reasonably and diligent action to 
quickly confirm or dispel lone officer's suspicions and did not convert hour-long wait into 
an arrest); State v. Wilkens, 465 N.W.2d 206, 210-11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (investigatory 
detention of defendant for an hour to an hour and 20 minutes did not ripen into illegal arrest 
while police diligently obtained witness' statement, found victim of sexual assault and 
robbery, calmed her down, took her statement, and immediately sent her for possible 
identification of defendant); People v. Bowen, 240 Cal. Rptr. 466,469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) 
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(detention of handcuffed suspect for 25 minutes to wait for transport of purse-snatching 
victim not unduly prolonged, especially since police vehicle transporting victim became 
caught in traffic). Accord State v, Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183,185 (Utah App. 1996) (upholding 
extended detention of driver stopped on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol 
for five to ten minutes to allow for arrival of backup officer to perform field sobriety test). 
In this case, the trial court concluded that "the officers had at least an articulable 
suspicion regarding the occupants of the cab as being involved in the robbery which they 
were investigating," to justify the initial stop (R. 160). At the evidentiary hearing, the court 
reflected on whether reasonable suspicion that a defendant committed a serious crime, as 
in this case, justified a more extended detention than for a routine traffic stop, to allow the 
victim sufficient time to arrive and view the suspect (R. 272:111-13). The court resolved 
the matter in its written decision: "[TJaking into account the nature of the crime being 
investigated," the manner of defendant's continued detention, including its length, "was 
reasonable to effect the purpose of the stop and . . . was appropriate" (R. 161-62). The 
court's conclusions are well founded in law. 
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's conclusion as to defendant's 
continued detention once the police discovered he was not Hispanic and was wearing a dark 
baseball cap. Aplt. Br. at 22. However, as discussed above, police had at least reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant, notwithstanding that the officers also discovered a 
contradictory fact. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043,1048 (Pa. 1995) (rejecting 
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African-American defendant's challenge to stop based on matching description of vehicle 
that was seen at crime and was only car in vicinity, although suspect was described as white 
or "Mexican"). 
More importantly, defendant fails to challenge the trial court's finding that "[t]he 
officers detained the defendant and co-suspect, Rosillo, near the location of the stop to see 
if they could be identified by the victim,... [t]he victim was close, and the detention would 
be of short duration" (R. 162). Defendant also fails to challenge the court's conclusion that 
"such a procedure [was] proper" (R. 162). The record supports the court's findings and 
conclusion - - Lund was summoned from the Embassy Suites almost immediately after 
defendant and Rosillo were apprehended, and he arrived at the showup within five minutes 
(R. 272:69-70). In the circumstances of the stop, that defendant and Rosillo were 
reasonably suspected of committing an armed robbery only moments before, Officers Carter 
and Hamideh "diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or 
dispel their suspicions quickly." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S. Ct. at 1575. 
In sum, defendant has failed to show that the trial court improperly concluded that 
the stop was reasonably extended for the brief period for Lund to appear and provide a 
possible identification.3 In any case, even if the officers' conduct in detaining defendant 
3
 Implicit in the trial court's conclusion that defendant was properly detained until 
Lund positively identified him as one of the robbers, is that the positive identification of 
defendant as one of the robbers provided probable cause to arrest defendant. See State v. 
Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah App. 1998) (finding witness's reliable showup 
identification of defendant was admissible to show probable cause). Accord State v. 
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until Lund arrived went beyond the permissible limits of an investigatory stop, their conduct 
was justified upon their immediate discovery of facts providing probable cause to arrest 
defendant, i.e., that defendant and Rosillo matched Lund's descriptions of the robbers. 
C. Reasonable suspicion immediately ripened into probable cause to 
arrest when officers discovered that the occupants of the cab 
matched the victim's descriptions of the robbers, thus supporting 
a search incident to arrest. 
"A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without 
warrant, arrest a person: . . . (2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or class 
A misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested 
has committed it." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(2). There must be a fair or "'substantial 
probability that a crime has been committed and that a specific individual committed the 
McArthur, 2000 UT App. 23, ^33, 996 P.2d 555 (finding witness's positive identification 
of unique items reported stolen "could not fail to support probable cause"); State v. 
Womack, 967 P.2d 536, 541 (Utah App. 1997) ("determining probable cause based on 
current circumstances exists '[w]hen the affidavit shows that an identified individual [] 
anticipates receiving [ ] specific contraband through the mail at a particular location'") 
(citation omitted). Moreover, probable cause that defendant was one of the robbers 
supports an arrest and, consequently, a search incident to that arrest. See State v. 
Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah App. 1995) (probable cause to arrest justified search 
of suspect's person incident to arrest) (citation omitted). Thus, in addition to the trial 
court's conclusion that the search of defendant's person resulted from his voluntary 
consent, see Aple. Br. at Point 1(D), there exists the additional legal ground that the 
discovery of defendant's wallet was justified incident to defendant's arrest. To the extent 
this Court may regard this conclusion as an independent, alternative basis for the 
discovery of defendant's wallet, it is justified. See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305 
f31 n.4, 989 P.2d 503 (rejecting Batson claim on alternative proper ground that the 
defendant failed to establish a prima facie case) (citing State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 357 
(Utah 1996)). 
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crime.9" State v. Clark,200\ UT9,H 11 n.l, 20P.3d300 (quoting Taylor v. Meacham, 82 
F.3d 1556,1562 (10th Cir.1996)). 'The quantum of evidence needed for probable cause is 
significantly less than that needed to prove guilt." Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (quoting State 
v. hartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989). "Utah appellate courts have observed 
that 'probable cause does not require more than a rationally based conclusion of 
probability,' . . . and that probable cause is 'only the probability, and not a prima facie 
showing, of criminal activity.'" Id. (citations omitted). The same factors used in Mulcahy 
to determine reeasonable suspicion are applicable to determine if officers had probable 
cause to believe that the occupants of the cab in this case had committed an armed robbery 
and to arrest them. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at [^16. 
1. The source of the information 
As with the foregoing discussion on reasonable suspicion, see Aple. Br. at Point 
I.A.I, all the informants providing information to the dispatcher were citizen-informants 
who personally observed the facts that they relayed to dispatch, and thus fundamentally 
reliable. See State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 % 14,40 P.3d 1146 (assuming veracity of 
citizen-informant who witnessed crime in determining probable cause for warrant). 
2. The amount of detail 
Lund provided a general description of the robbers, and two people matching that 
description were found leaving the scene of the crime in a cab shortly after the crime 
occurred (R. 15, 272:9-10). Courts have unanimously agreed that a general description 
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accompanied by proximity to the time and place of the crime is sufficient give officers 
probable cause to arrest. See, e.g., Dunn v. Alaska, 653 P.2d 1071,1077-1078 (Alaska App. 
1982) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest suspect matching general description 
of armed robber, a "black male with short Afro and Fatigue jacket," apprehended within 
twenty minutes of robbery seven blocks from crime scene); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 
723-724 (Ariz. 1985) (finding that probable cause existed to arrest burglary suspect who fit 
general description, "Mexican looking male wearing dark blue," and who was found near 
crime scene when crime occurred in sparsely populated area); Commonwealth v. Brown, 326 
A.2d 906,218-219 (Pa. Super. 1974) (finding probable cause existed to arrest suspect found 
one half hour after mid-aftemoon robbery near crime scene where suspect matched general 
description of robber, black male, 5f10" height, 160 pounds, gold rim glasses, full length 
brown coat); State v. Burgess, 716 P.2d 948, 951 (Wash. App. 1986), rev. denied, 106 
Wash. 2d 1004 (1986) ("Probable cause exists when an officer makes an arrest based on a 
physical description of the defendant and when the officer finds that the defendant is in 
close proximity in time and distance to the crime site"). 
As set out in detail above, see Aple. Br. at Point I.A.2, the officers heard dispatches 
about an armed robbery that had just occurred (R. 272:17-18,41-43); they received a general 
description of the suspects that included their sex, race, height, age, and description of 
clothing (R. 272:17-18,29,31); they apprehended two men matching the descriptions of the 
robbers, who were seen leaving the crime scene in a taxi cab twenty minutes after the crime 
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occurred (R. 272:7-8,14,18,27-28,43); and they stopped the cab which undisputedly was 
the one in which the suspected robbers were traveling (R. 272:18-19, 43). The trial court 
that this information provided the officers with probable cause to arrest defendant (R. 161). 
A finding of probable cause is further supported by the time of the robbery. At three o'clock 
in the morning few people are on the streets or even awake. The record indicates that, 
although a bulletin had been dispatched to all units in the area, the police only stopped one 
other pair who were immediately released because they were not Hispanic (R. 272:18,49). 
5. The police officer ys personal observations 
When Officer Hamideh removed defendant from the car he observed defendant 
matched the description in all of the particulars transmitted to him (R. 272:44,49-50, 52). 
Additionally, the trial court correctly found, based on Lund's identification of defendant at 
the showup, that defendant was wearing a baseball cap, a detail reported by Lund and 
received by the officers from dispatch (R. 161; 272:18, 66, 79). Further, the trial court 
found that "co-defendant Rosillo matched the description given by the victim," a fact the 
officers would have observed and which is not challenged on appeal (R. 161). 
Defendant argues that the officers should have released him as soon as he got out of 
the cab because he did not fit the description given by the victim. Aplt. Br. at 22. 
Specifically, defendant claims that he is Caucasian, not Hispanic, and that he was wearing 
a red baseball cap, not a dark baseball cap. Aplt. Br. at 22. These discrepancies are not 
significant on the facts of this case. First, probable cause, which requires "only the 
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probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity," Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226, 
does not disintegrate in the face of some discrepancies in otherwise substantially matching 
physical descriptions of the suspect. Cf. United States v. Hummer, 916 F.2d 186, 190 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (probable cause for arrest where the defendant made suspicious statements, wore 
clothing similar to that of person observed fleeing from agents, and suddenly veered away 
upon observing agent), cert denied, 499 U.S. 970,111 S. Ct. 1608 (1991); Hawkins v. State, 
660 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (probable cause to arrest where officer stopped 
the defendant based on similarities in appearance of defendant and his car to witnesses' 
description), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1089, 113 S. Ct. 1137 (1993). 
More importantly, the alleged discrepancies in this case are either trivial or 
nonexistent. Regarding the baseball cap, Lund reported that one of the robbers wore a "red" 
baseball cap (R. 272:66). The officers' variously heard from dispatch that one of the 
suspects was wearing a "baseball cap" or a "dark" baseball cap (R. 272:18, 50). Plainly, a 
red baseball cap may be "dark" in color or may appear so by artificial light in the middle of 
the night. As to defendant's ethnicity, the witnesses acknowledged at the suppression 
hearing that defendant appeared to be Caucasian or not Hispanic (R. 272:25, 52, 81). 
However, at trial, Officer Hamideh, who is Hispanic, clarified his suppression hearing 
testimony. Officer Hamideh testified that defendant was "not as tan" at trial as he was the 
day he was arrested and that based on the officer's background and defendant's appearance, 
defendant had "a Hispanic appearance" at the time he was apprehended (R. 274:244-49). 
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In fact, defendant may reasonably be taken for a Hispanic. See State's Exhibit #3, lineup 
photograph of defendant taken night of offense, included in State's Exhibit #17. 
In sum, based on information already received about the offense and the two 
suspects, Officer Hamideh had sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant when he and 
Officer Carter removed defendant and Rosillo from the cab and discovered that they 
matched the descriptions of the robbers, justifying a search incident to arrest. Spurgeon, 904 
P.2d at 227. In any event, defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his person. 
D. Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his back pocket. 
Warrantless searches "areper se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); U.S. 
Const, amend. IV). One such exception is a search performed pursuant to consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). When the State justifies a 
warrantless search on the basis of consent, "the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments require 
that [the State] demonstrate that the consent was (1) voluntarily given and (2) not the result 
of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (1973). The Utah 
Supreme Court has adopted five factors to show a lack of duress or coercion: 1) the absence 
of a claim of authority; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere 
request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the property or item to be searched; and 
5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 
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103,106 (Utah 1980). "Consent given while in custody does not, perse, render the consent 
involuntary." State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (1990). Rather, the Whittenback factors 
are considered together to determine if, under the totality of the circumstances, the consent 
was voluntary.4 Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106. 
When the Whittenback factors are applied to the full circumstances of the consent, 
it is clear that the consent was voluntary and not the product of duress or coercion. Officer 
Hamideh asked defendant if he could remove and inspect defendant's wallet by asking, 
"Mind if I take that out?" (R. 272:46). Defendant replied, "No" (R. 272:46). Officer 
Hamideh then asked a clarifying question, "No, I can't take it out?" to which defendant 
replied, "Oh, okay, take it out" (R. 272:46). On these facts, and in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, the trial court found that defendant's consent to Officer Hamideh's request 
to see his wallet was voluntary (R. 160). The record supports the trial court's legal 
conclusion. 
1. Claim of authority 
Officer Hamideh made no claim of authority to conduct the search, but instead 
politely requested permission to examine the wallet. When it appeared that there may have 
been some ambiguity in his first statement, Officer Hamideh asked a clarifying question to 
make sure that he correctly understood defendant's response and that defendant had, in fact, 
4
 Defendant has not argued that the State failed to prove that defendant waived his 
right not be searched, and such a showing is no longer necessary according to State v. 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 47, 37 P.3d 1073. Voluntary consent, not waiver, is the test. 
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consented to the officer's request (R. 272:46). 
2. Show of force 
Officer Carter drew his sidearm before removing the co-defendant, Rosillo, from the 
cab, but Officer Hamideh did not draw his sidearm before removing defendant (R. 272:34, 
51). A show of force towards Rosillo is irrelevant to whether defendant's consent was 
voluntary. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, [^49 ("examination [of Whittenback factors] is limited to 
whether duress or coercion was exerted on the person who consented to search," and 
concluding that prior show of force directed toward the defendant irrelevant to issue of the 
defendant's mother's consent). The only action by Officer Hamideh that could arguably be 
viewed as a show of force is handcuffing defendant. But, "[t]he fact that defendant was 
immediately handcuffed upon arrest and remained handcuffed . . . does not defeat a 
conclusion of voluntariness." Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1274. "It is but a single element for the 
trial court to consider." Id. Here, it should be given little weight in view of defendant's 
understanding that he was an armed robbery suspect and was handcuffed for officer safety, 
not for coercion during an investigatory stop. The officers had not yet found the gun used 
in the robbery and, therefore, were justified in a believing that the gun could still be on one 
of the defendants or in the back seat of the cab. 
3. Mere request to search 
Officer Hamideh only asked, "Mind if I take it out?" A question so phrased is a mere 
request to search. Officer Hamideh did not command defendant to empty his pockets; rather 
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he asked defendant what was in his pocket. The question contains none of the coercive 
factors with which Whittenback is concerned and was entirely appropriate in the context of 
an investigatory stop. 
4. Cooperation by the owner 
Defendant fully cooperated with Officer Hamideh as shown in their dialog. While 
defendant's first answer, "No," arguably might have indicated a refusal of the officer's 
request, it might also have signaled an assent. Rather than proceeding, Officer Hamideh 
inquired, "No, I can't take it out?" Defendant's clarifying statement, "Oh, okay, take it out," 
unequivocably and unambiguously demonstrated his intent to cooperate. Compare State v. 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f20, 17 P.3d 1135 (finding officer failed to give clear and 
positive testimony about detainee's response to somewhat ambiguous question about 
whether detainee would permit a search), cert, granted, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001 ).5 
5. The absence of deception or trickery on the part of the officer 
Officer Hamideh engaged in neither artifice nor deception. Defendant variously 
argues that the officers' conduct in ordering defendant and Rosillo from the car at gunpoint, 
telling them that they were considered armed and dangerous, and frisking and then 
handcuffing them, all following an illegal detention and seizure, was so coercive that 
defendant's consent could not have been voluntary. Aplt. Br. at 20-21, 23-25. The 
5
 But see Bisner, 2001 UT 99 at j^ (abrogating voluntariness test set out in State v. 
Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah App. 1996) and applied by this Court in Hansen). 
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argument implies that the officers' reasonable protective actions were a device to induce 
him to consent to Officer Hamideh's request to view the contents of his pocket. However, 
under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's excited description loses its vitality. 
First, Officer Carter did not use as intense security measures as in a normal felony 
stop (R. 272:20). Also, Officer Carter, although he drew his sidearm, had "extremely 
limited" contact with defendant (R. 272:20-21). As noted, Officer Hamideh dealt with 
defendant, and he did not approach or draw a gun in handling defendant (R. 272:44). See 
Eisner, 2001UT 99 at f 49 (recognizing that although police officers drew their weapons on 
the defendant when he exited the house, there was no showing of coercive force against 
Bisner's mother whom the police approached with their weapons holstered). Further, 
although defendant was frisked and then handcuffed, those circumstances do not compel a 
finding that the environment was so coercive that defendant could not have refused consent. 
In State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial 
court's determination that the defendant's second consent to search storage units was 
voluntary even though five hours earlier the police had broken down the door to his home, 
routed him out of bed naked, told him his refusal to give consent would be useless because 
a warrant would be obtained in any case, and held him in handcuffs for almost the entire 
period before he again gave his consent. Id. at 1272-73. Similarly, this Court in Bobo, 
concluded that a defendant voluntarily gave police his consent to search his home even 
though he agreed only after repeated requests to search while detained in his home, 
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handcuffed, apparently in the company of his guests, and was told that a warrant was being 
obtained. Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1270-71,1274-75. Other courts have found consents to search 
voluntary in under similar circumstances. See United States v. Strache, 202 F.3d 980, 985 
(7th Cir. 2000) (finding consent voluntary despite defendant being accosted by several 
police officers and placed in custody where no other evidence of coercive police action was 
presented); United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332,333-334 (7th .Cir. 1994) (finding consent 
to search store where defendant worked voluntary even though defendant was in custody 
and police entered store with weapons drawn); United States v. Murphy, 16 F. Supp. 2d 397, 
401 (S.D.N. Y. 1998) (finding renter's consent to search apartment valid even though renter 
was in custody, handcuffed, and there were eight police officers in apartment with renter); 
People v. Licea, 918 P.2d 1109,1113 (Colo 1996) (finding defendant voluntarily consented 
to search of his car even though he was only eighteen years old, in police custody, was not 
advised of his constitutional rights, and "chemically messed up" from ingesting drugs). 
In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances and in light of the Whittenback 
factors, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's consent to have Officer Hamideh 
examine his wallet was voluntary. 
Thus, this search was justified as incident to defendant's arrest based on probable 
cause that he was one of the armed robbers or upon his voluntary consent. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
RELIABLE 
Defendant argues that the trial court's analysis of the showup was inadequate. Aplt. 
Br. at 26. He contends that Lund did not have adequate time to view defendant during the 
robbery and that Lund did not pay close attention to defendant's appearance. Aplt. Br. at 
27. Specifically, defendants asserts that Lund could not have been paying close attention 
to defendant's appearance because Lund described defendant as Hispanic and wearing a 
dark cap rather than as Caucasian with a red cap. Aplt. Br. at 27. Finally, defendant argues 
that the show up was unacceptably suggestive because defendant was cuffed and surrounded 
by police officers and because Lund heard over the police radio that his driver's license was 
found on defendant's person. Aplt. Br. at 27-28. 
A. The eyewitness identification of defendant was constitutionally reliable. 
In State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court extended its recognition that eyewitness 
testimony is potent yet fallible, see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,488-91 (Utah 1986), thereby 
requiring the trial court, in cases where eyewitness identification was central to the case, to 
undertake "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability," before admitting such 
testimony under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
780 (Utah 1991). Noting that "[t]he ultimate question to be determined is whether, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable," this Court listed the 
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following pertinent factors by which reliability must be determined: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. 
This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one 
in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the 
race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id. at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). The burden is on the State to show that the 
identification is reliable. Id. at 778. 
1. Opportunity of Lund to view defendant during the robbery 
The first Ramirez factor to be considered in assessing an identification for reliability 
is the witness's opportunity to view the defendant. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. This includes 
examining "the length of time the witness viewed the actor; the distance between the witness 
and the actor; [and] whether the witness could view the actor's face." Id. The quality of 
light and presence of distractions are also considered under the first factor. Id. 
Lund had a clear view of the robbers' faces from about five feet away in "pretty 
good" lighting (R. 272:67). He viewed them at a distance of only five feet (R. 272:66). The 
robbery took approximately fifteen seconds and during which time Lund was focused on his 
assailants' faces (R. 272:67-68). There was a light directly over the vacuum where he was 
working (R. 272:67). Lund had a good enough view of the robbers to be able to see that the 
robbers were male and appeared to be Hispanics, about 5'10, wearing dark clothing, one 
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with a gun, and one with a red baseball cap (R. 272:9-10, 66-67, 77-79). 
2. Lund's degree of attention to defendant at the time of the event 
The second reliability factor examines the witness' degree of attention to the 
defendant. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. This factor looks at whether the witness was "fully 
aware [of] what was taking place." Id. Lund was fully aware of defendant's presence during 
the robbery and remained focused on the robbers throughout the event (R. 272:66-69). 
Defendant's contention that Lund did not pay attention to defendant during the 
robbery because he described defendant as Hispanic with a dark baseball cap instead of 
Caucasian with a red baseball cap is unsubstantial. Defendant is not clearly Caucasian and 
could easily be mistaken for any number of racial or ethnic groups, including Hispanic.6 A 
baseball hat may be both red and dark depending on the shade of red, the lighting, and 
whether the hat was clean or dirty. In any event, defendant's claim rings hollow alongside 
the specificity of Lund's additional physical descriptions of defendant's height, build, and 
age, whose accuracy is unchallenged on appeal. 
6
 Defendant contends that Lund's description of defendant as Hispanic is 
erroneous. As already mentioned, see Aple. Br. at Point I.C.3 n.6, the photograph of 
defendant in the transcript of the lineup proceedings clearly shows that defendant could 
easily be mistaken for a Hispanic. See State's Exhibit #3, lineup photograph of defendant 
taken night of offense, included in State's #17. Defendant has dark hair and facial 
features similar to many Hispanics. At trial, Officer Hamideh, who is Hispanic, said that 
defendant "had a Hispanic appearance" and that defendant's skin color was that of a 
Hispanic (R. 274:245-246). 
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3. Lund's capacity to observe the event including his physical and mental acuity 
The third reliability factor focuses on the physical and mental capacities of the 
witness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. "Here the relevant circumstances include whether the 
witness's capacity to observe was impaired." Id. Possible impairments derive from "stress 
or fright. . . personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or 
by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol." Id. 
Lund's capacity to observe the event was affected only by the fear that normally 
accompanies being robbed at gunpoint. It is reasonable to assume that Lund experienced 
some fear, but there is no evidence that Lund was physically assaulted or physically affected 
in any way by the robbery. His perception was unimpaired by drugs or medication (R. 
272:68). Two a.m. was a near the end of his regular work shift and was not an unusual time 
for him to be awake (R. 272:68). There is no evidence that Lund had any bias or prejudice 
towards the individuals robbing him, nor is there any evidence that Lund's vision was 
anything but perfect. 
4. Whether Lund's identification was made spontaneously and 
remained consistent, or whether it was the product of suggestion 
The fourth reliability factor assesses the genuineness of the identification. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 783. The circumstances considered involve "the length of time that passed 
between the witness's observations at the time of the event and the identification of 
defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the identification; 
the witness's exposure to opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information from 
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other sources." Id. Other important circumstances include those "instances when the 
witness or other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with 
defendant [and] circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for 
identification." Id. This factor explores "whether the witness's identification was... the 
product of suggestion." Id. at 784 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). 
Lund's identification of defendant was spontaneous. Lund arrived for the show-up 
only fifteen minutes after the robbery and, before the officer could give him any 
instructions, Lund immediately identified defendant and Rosillo as the robbers (R. 272:69-
71). The squad car in which Lund was riding was parked forty feet from the suspects and 
the area was "fairly well lit" from overhead lights and police spotlights (R. 272:72). There 
is no evidence that Lund suffered from any physical or mental impairment at the time of the 
identification or that he was anything but awake, alert, and capable of identifying those who 
robbed him. 
Lund's identification remained consistent. A few days after the initial show up, Lund 
positively identified defendant at a line up at the county jail (R. 272:74; State's Exhibit #17). 
Lund also positively identified defendant at the preliminary hearing, the evidentiary hearing, 
and at trial (R. 271:4-5, 272:72-73, 273:148). 
The suggestiveness of the identification of defendant by Lund did not exceed the 
level of suggestiveness dismissed by the court in Ramirez. In Ramirez, the defendant was 
handcuffed alone to a chainlink fence, surrounded by police officers, and illuminated by the 
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headlights from several police cars. 817 P.2d at 784. The witnesses had heard remarks by 
police prior to the show up that officers had apprehended someone who fit the description 
of the robbers. Id. The court recognized that "[t]he blatant suggestiveness of the showup 
is troublesome" but deferred to "the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor evidence" and 
held the identification constitutionally reliable. Id, Similarly, in the present case, defendant 
was handcuffed, surrounded by police, and illuminated by a police spotlight. Thus, the 
suggestiveness of the showup was no greater than in Ramirez. 
Defendant argues that the Lund's identification was not spontaneous but was the 
product of suggestion because Lund heard over the police radio that one of the suspects had 
Lund's driver's license and credit cards. Aplt. Br. at 27-28. This single fact, considered 
with the other suggestive circumstances of the show up, is insufficient to overcome the 
overwhelming evidence in support of reliability. "The ultimate question to be determined 
is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable." Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 781. Every other factor considered under the Ramirez test weighs in favor of 
finding reliability. Lund had a clear view of the robbers for a sustained period of time in a 
well lit area. Lund was not distracted from the robbers but remained focused on them 
throughout the encounter. Lund was fully awake and unimpaired by drugs or medication, 
and the identification was made spontaneously within twenty minutes of the robbery and 
remained consistent thereafter. 
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5. The nature of the event observed by Lund and the likelihood 
that he would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly 
The last reliability factor concerns the nature of the incident observed and the 
likelihood of it being perceived and remembered correctly by the witness. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 781. "This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one 
in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed and whether the race of the actor 
was the same as the observer's." Id. With respect to the routineness of the event, the court 
in Long observed that "people usually remember with some detail and clarity their 
whereabouts at the time they learned of John F. Kennedy's assassination," but "few of us 
can remember the color or make of the car that was in front of us at the last traffic signal 
where we waited for the light to turn green." 721 P.2d at 489. 
The robbery is almost certainly galvanized Lund's attention. He testified that the 
situation was "upsetting," "stressful," and "scary" (R. 272:78). There was no evidence that 
Lund had ever previously been robbed at gunpoint or that such crimes were commonplace 
in his neighborhood or line of work. The record contains no evidence of Lund's race. 
B. Lund's identification is superior to the eyewitness identification in Ramirez* 
While the foregoing particularized application of the Ramirez factors demonstrates 
the reliability of Lund's identification, that reliability is even more readily and simply 
proven by comparing this case with Ramirez itself. 
In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court found reliable the identification of a gunman 
in a nighttime robbery. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 884. The eyewitness, all the time under attack 
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from a pipe wielding accomplice to the offense, identified the masked gunman (the 
defendant) as he hid behind the corner of a building at a distance variously described as 
from ten to thirty feet. Id. at 776, 782-784. The eyewitness viewed the defendant in time 
periods variously described as from one second to a minute or longer in lighting variously 
described as from "good" to "poor." Id. at 782-83. Prior to the showup, police officers told 
the eyewitness that they had apprehended a suspect who matched the description given to 
them. Id. at 784. At the showup conducted in the middle of the night, Ramirez was 
handcuffed to a chainlink fence and had the headlights from, several police cars focused on 
him. Id. Notwithstanding that the case was "extremely close," the Ramirez court held that 
"[considering the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision and giving 
due deference to the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor evidence, we cannot say that 
[the eyewitness's] testimony is legally insufficient when considered in light of the other 
circumstances to warrant a preliminary finding of reliability and, therefore, admissibility." 
Id. 
By contrast, the circumstances of Lund's identification were far more favorable than 
those in Ramirez. During the robbery, Lund had a clear view of both robbers faces from 
only five feet away and for at least ten to fifteen seconds (R. 272:67-68). Although it was 
nighttime, the encounter occurred directly underneath an overhead lamp (R. 272:67). The 
robbers did not mask or in any other way disguise themselves (R. 272:66-68). Lund was not 
physically attacked by either robber (R. 272:66-68). At the showup, the circumstances were 
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similar to those of Ramirez. Defendant was handcuffed, though not to a chainlink fence, 
surrounded by police, and lit up by police car headlights (R. 272:70). However, Lund 
identified defendant immediately and without hesitation, and his identification remained 
consistent throughout subsequent line-up, preliminary, evidentiary, and trial proceedings (R. 
272:71). See also State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35 (comparing identification with 
circumstances in Ramirez to determine constitutional reliability). 
The facts are clear that, in the present case, the identification is in every particular 
superior to that in Ramirez, excepting only Lund's pre-showup knowledge that one of the 
suspects had his driver's license. (R. 272:80). This one fact, standing alone against the 
great weight of the evidence favoring reliability, is insufficient to render the identification 
constitutionally unreliable. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d 781 (holding that task of appellate court 
is to "determine from the totality of the circumstances whether the admission of the 
identification is consistent with the due process guarantees of article I section 7"). 
Defendant cites no authority for his claim that Lund's inadvertent discovery that defendant 
had been found with his driver's license is so suggestive that it negates the overwhelming 
indicia of an otherwise reliable identification. Indeed, the cases refute defendant's claim. 
In State v. Jackson, 200 S.E.2d 626 (N.C.I 973), the victim, unable to identify her assailant 
visually, identified the defendant by his voice. Id. at 630. Later, it was discovered that the 
prosecution had informed the victim prior to trial that the defendant's fingerprint had been 
found in her apartment. Id. at 631. Notwithstanding this highly suggestive evidence that 
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could reasonably have tainted the victim's identification, the reviewing court, based on the 
record, stated: "We do not believe that the total circumstances surrounding the District 
Court confrontation established a Very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification." Id. Other courts have reached the same conclusion where the witness's 
discovery of suggestive information was inadvertent, not the product of police impropriety, 
and the remaining circumstances of the identification otherwise suggested that it was 
reliable. See State v. Sims, 745 So. 2d 151, 158 (La. Ct. App. 1999) ("An immediate and 
definite identification resulting from an inadvertent meeting between a witness and a suspect 
will be found reliable and admissible where there is no indication of impropriety or 
suggestiveness.") (citations omitted), writ denied, 762 So. 2d 11 (La. 2000); Commonwealth 
v. Drane, 712 N.E.2d 1162,1163 (Mass. Ct. App. 1999) (no impermissible suggestiveness 
where, although witness inadvertently saw the defendant handcuffed in police station prior 
to identification, identification was spontaneous and found by trial court to be reliable), rev. 
denied, 733 N.E.2d 124 (Mass. 2000). 
The trial court, in a privileged position to appraise all the circumstances bearing on 
the eyewitness identification, including Lund's bearing as a witness, made the following 
findings and conclusion in denying defendant's motion to suppress: 
Finally, the Court ruled at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing that 
the initial show-up and identification of the defendant as one of the two that 
were involved in the robbery was proper. The Court determined that there 
was no inappropriate suggestion on the part of the police officers. The victim, 
Mr. Lund, not only made an immediate positive identification of the 
defendant and the co-defendant as being the persons who robbed him a few 
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moments before at the Ute Car Wash on 300 East and 300 South, but has 
remained consistent in that identification through various court hearings and 
a line-up after the defendant's arrest. 
(R. 160-61). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court correctly found that 
the Lund's eyewitness identification was reliable. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784 (directing 
review of "the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision [while]giving due 
deference to the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor evidence"). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above discussion, the state respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. * 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<? day of April, 2002 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A.^RONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
'VK 
IM TBI DZ8TRZCT COURT OF THI THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IM AMD FOR SALT LAXI COUMTY, STATI OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW OWEM8 NALLBRY, 
Defendant. 
MIMUTE EMTRY 
CASE MO. 001914668 
The above-referenced matter was before the Court on April 9, 
2001, at 9:00 a.m. Counsel for the State and the defendant were 
present, and the defendant was present. The Court took evidence 
regarding the matters raised in the defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Personal and Residential Search, as veil as initial identification 
of the defendant. Following the taking of evidence, the Court 
heard closing arguments of counsel and ruled on a number of the 
issues raised in the defendant's Motion, and took certain portions 
of the Motion under advisement. The Court has reviewed the 
evidence, the arguments of counsel and the written submissions, and 
being fully advised, enters the following Minute Entry decision. 
The Court determined that the search of the residence at 228 
South 300 East was with permission of the occupant, and that there 
was no constitutional infirmity with regard to that search. During 
that search, the victim's wallet and a firearm that matched the 
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description of the firearm used In the armed robbery were located. 
The Court therefore denied the defendant's Notion to Suppress the 
evidence obtained during the search of the residence. 
The Court further determined that the search of the 
defendant's person, assuming the detention was otherwise 
appropriate, at the scene of the location where the police officers 
stopped the cab In which the defendant and co-defendant were 
riding, was with the defendant's consent. 
Further, the Court ruled that the initial stop of the cab in 
which the defendant and the co-defendant were riding was 
appropriate. The Court determined that the officers had at least 
an articulable suspicion regarding the occupants of the cab as 
being involved in the robbery which they were investigating. 
Finally, the Court ruled at the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing that the initial show-up and identification of the 
defendant as one of the two that were involved in the robbery where 
Mr. Lund was the victim was proper. The Court determined that 
there was no inappropriate suggestion on the part of the police 
officers. The victim, Mr. Lund, not only made an immediate 
positive identification of the defendant and the co-defendant as 
being the persons who robbed him a few moments before at the Ute 
Car Wash on 300 East and 300 South, but has remained consistent in 
that identification through various court hearings and a line-up 
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after the defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion 
to Suppress the initial identification of him by the victim at the 
scene of the stop is denied. 
After considering the position of the parties, the Court is 
satisfied that the detention and the manner of detention, including 
the length of detention of the defendant after the initial stop, 
was proper. The Court determines that not only did the officers 
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to make the initial stop, 
but after the defendant was out of the cab, the police not only had 
a continued articulable suspicion, but had additional facts to 
constitute probable cause so as to believe that the defendant was 
involved in the robbery at the Ute Car Wash a few minutes before. 
The defendant Mallery was found wearing a baseball cap as was 
reported to the police officers. The defendant matched the build 
and height given as identification of the perpetrators of the 
robbery, and the defendant came from the immediate area of the 
robbery in the cab just a few minutes after the robbery occurred. 
The age of both the defendant and the co-defendant Rosillo matched 
the description given by the victim, Mr. Lund. In addition to all 
the foregoing that created probable cause for the officers to 
believe that the defendant had been involved in a robbery a few 
minutes before at the Ute Car Wash, there was additional 
information after the defendant voluntarily agreed to have his 
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person searched by the police officer, where identification and 
other documents relating to the victim, Mr. Lund, were located. 
Those documents found in the voluntary search of the defendant's 
person serve to increase the quantity of information available to 
the police officers to create additional probable cause regarding 
the defendant Mallery. 
The nature of the detention was reasonable to effect the 
purpose of the stop and, talcing into account the nature of the 
crime being investigated, the manner of the detention was 
appropriate as well. The officers detained the defendant and co-
suspect, Rosillo, near the location of the stop to see if they 
could be identified by the victim, and such a procedure is proper. 
The victim was close and the detention would be of short duration. 
The fact that the defendant was handcuffed while being detained by 
the police officers, while not usually called for, is appropriate 
under the circumstances where a crime being investigated was a 
crime involving the use of a firearm. 
Accordingly, the defendant's complaint that he was improperly 
detained after the initial stop in an unreasonable manner for an 
unreasonable length of time, so as to void the initial 
identification or void the voluntary search of the defendant's 
person, are without substance and as previously indicated, denied. 
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The Court will expect counsel for the State to prepare 
detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav, and an Order 
denying the defendant's Motion addressed/not only at the conclusion 
of the evidentiary hearing on April 9/2001, but also as set forth 
In this Minute Entry decision* 
Dated this / 3 day of April j/2001. 
?IMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MMHIW CWTIFICATl 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this / ^ day of April, 
2001: 
Byron F. Burmester 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard P. Mauro 
Attorney for Defendant 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
y c ^ 1J^^ruL^^ 
